Term: 2008
Docket: 07-1437
Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. Hif Bio, Inc., Et Al.
- Pro
07-1437 CARLSBAD TECHNOLOGY, INC. V. HIF BIO, INC. DECISION BELOW: 508 F.3d 659 CERT. GRANTED 10/14/2008 QUESTION PRESENTED: In Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988), this Court held that district courts could remand removed claims upon deciding not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). However, in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2007), the Court stated that “it is far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental jurisdiction is declined the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d)” and noted that “[w]e have never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional for purposes of post-1988 versions § 1447(c) and § 1447(d).” Construing Powerex as leaving the question open, the Federal Circuit held that a remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction can be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thus disagreeing with the nine other federal courts of appeals that have construed Cohill as distinguishing between remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remands based on declining to exercise subject matter jurisdiction that already exists. Thus, this petition presents the question posed but left unanswered in Powerex that is now the subject of a direct conflict among the circuits: 1. Whether a district court’s order remanding a case to state court following its discretionary decision to decline to exercise the supplemental jurisdiction accorded to federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is properly held to be a remand for a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) so that such remand order is barred from any appellate review by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 2006-1522
In the case of Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., et al., 2008, the U.S Supreme Court ruled that federal district courts have discretion to remand cases to state court after dismissing all claims over which they had original jurisdiction. The dispute began when HIF Bio sued Carlsbad and other defendants in a California state court for alleged violations of both federal patent law and various state laws. The defendants moved the case to Federal District Court under its federal question jurisdiction but later requested dismissal of the only claim that provided this basis for removal—the patent-law claim—leaving only issues related to state law remaining. After granting this request, however, instead of proceeding with these residual claims as per supplemental jurisdiction or sending them back (remanding) them to State Courts where it was originally filed from - an action contested by Carlsbad - it chose not exercise such authority citing lack thereof due to absence of any more 'federal' matters left in dispute; a decision overturned by Supreme Court stating otherwise i.e., even if no 'federal' matter remains post-dismissal(s), courts can still choose whether or not they wish continue hearing rest (state-related) part(s).
In the dissenting opinion for Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., Justice Thomas argued that the majority's decision to allow federal courts to remand cases back to state court even after denying jurisdiction over a federal claim was inconsistent with previous case law and misinterpreted 28 U.S.C §1447(c). He contended that this statute only permits remands in instances where a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction altogether, not when it simply declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over state claims. According to him, once a federal question is presented and dismissed, the district court retains discretion under §1367(c) whether or not to adjudicate related state-law claims but cannot send them back using §1447(c). Thus he disagreed with expanding the scope of remand authority beyond what Congress intended.
