In the case of Cessna v. United States, 1897, the Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over land ownership in Kansas. The plaintiff, Cessna, claimed that he had purchased certain lands from an individual who had obtained them through preemption rights under federal law. However, these lands were part of a larger tract that was reserved for railroad purposes by Congress before they were sold to the individual from whom Cessna made his purchase. The government argued that since it never officially disposed of or relinquished its interest in this property and because it was reserved for public use prior to any private claim on it including preemption claims, title could not have passed to anyone else including Mr.Cessna's predecessor-in-interest. The court ruled in favor of the U.S., stating that while preemptive rights are recognized as valid by legislation and judicial decisions alike; such rights cannot be used against reservations made by Congress for specific public uses like railroads unless there is clear legislative intent allowing such action which wasn't present here. Therefore,the reservation took precedence over subsequent preemptive claims thus making Mr.Cessna's claim invalid.The decision reinforced Congressional authority over federal lands and clarified how conflicting interests between private individuals claiming preemption rights and those arising out of congressional reservations should be resolved.

In the dissenting opinion for Cessna v. United States, it was argued that the majority's decision to uphold a tax on distilled spirits produced by small-scale distillers violated principles of equal protection under the law. The dissenting justices believed that this tax unfairly targeted smaller producers while exempting larger corporations from paying their fair share. They also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of what constituted "manufacturing" under federal law, arguing that distilling should not be considered manufacturing because it does not involve creating a new product but rather refining an existing one. Furthermore, they contended that even if distilling were considered manufacturing, taxing only small-scale manufacturers would still violate equal protection principles as it discriminates against certain businesses based solely on size and scale of operation.