In the 1982 case of Chappell et al. v. Wallace et al., the United States Supreme Court ruled that enlisted military personnel cannot sue their commanding officers for alleged violations of constitutional rights. The plaintiffs, four African-American Navy enlisted men, claimed they were discriminated against on account of race by their superior officers and sought damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents (1971). However, the court held that special factors counseling hesitation in absence of affirmative action by Congress existed due to unique disciplinary structure present within military establishment and potential impact upon it if such suits were allowed to proceed in civilian courts. Therefore, no Bivens remedy was available as a matter of law when superior officers are sued for constitutional violations by subordinates within context where military discipline is implicated.

In the dissenting opinion for Chappell et al. v. Wallace et al., Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justice William Brennan, argued that military personnel should not be barred from seeking damages under civil rights laws when their superiors violate those rights. They contended that the majority's decision to deny servicemen this right was based on an overly broad interpretation of Feres doctrine and a misreading of prior case law. The justices believed that there were no special factors counseling hesitation in allowing such claims as they did not involve any question about military discipline or decision-making process which could disrupt the unique structure and needs of the armed forces. Furthermore, they pointed out that Congress had never explicitly exempted service members from these protections nor indicated any intention to do so implicitly through other legislation or actions.