Chatfield v. Boyle was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, Chatfield, was held in a federal prison in the state of Ohio. Chatfield sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the conditions of the detention. The Court's decision in Chatfield v. Boyle established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. This decision has been cited in numerous subsequent cases, and has been used to support the principle that state courts cannot interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Chatfield v. Boyle, arguing that the majority's decision was incorrect and should be reversed. He argued that a contract between two parties is binding upon them both, regardless of whether one party has received an advantage from it or not. The Court had previously held in other cases that when a contract is made for mutual benefit, each party must abide by its terms even if they have not been fully performed on either side. In this case, he argued that the plaintiff had entered into a valid agreement with defendant to pay him $1 per acre for land purchased from him; therefore, she was obligated to fulfill her part of the bargain despite having already received possession of said land before payment could be made. Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating that since there was no evidence presented at trial indicating any fraud or misrepresentation on behalf of either party regarding their contractual obligations towards one another, then plaintiff should still be required to make full payment as agreed upon under their original agreement.