In the case of Chemical Manufacturers Association et al. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., 1984, the U.S Supreme Court was tasked with interpreting provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA). The dispute arose when Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued permits to industrial plants allowing them to discharge pollutants into public waters under certain conditions. The Natural Resources Defense Council challenged this action arguing that it violated CWA's prohibition on pollutant discharge "except as in compliance" with other sections of the act which required use of best available technology to reduce pollution. However, EPA and Chemical Manufacturers Association argued that these permits were allowed under a provision permitting discharges from point sources composed entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture or stormwater runoff. The Supreme Court sided with EPA and industry groups ruling that their interpretation was permissible within CWA's framework because Congress had not directly addressed whether such blended waste streams could be exempted from stringent technology-based standards applicable to industrial pollutants.

In the dissenting opinion for Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority's interpretation of "source" in the Clean Air Act was too narrow and contrary to Congress' intent. He believed that Congress intended a broader definition of "source," which would include an entire plant rather than individual pollution-emitting devices within it. This broad interpretation would allow more flexibility for industries to meet emission standards by controlling pollution at some points within a plant but not necessarily all, as long as overall emissions were reduced - this is known as 'bubble concept'. The majority's narrower view could lead to unnecessary costs and inefficiencies without significantly improving air quality. Furthermore, he criticized their reliance on legislative history instead of clear statutory language and Congressional intent.