In the case of Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1967, Mr. Kwok was a Chinese citizen who entered the U.S legally in 1959 but overstayed his visa. He sought relief from deportation under Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which allows judicial review of "all final orders of deportation." The Supreme Court had to determine whether this section applied to decisions made by immigration officials outside formal deportation proceedings - specifically, their denial of Mr. Kwok's request for voluntary departure instead of forced removal. The Supreme Court ruled against Mr. Kwok, holding that Section 106(a) only applies to direct orders resulting from formal deportation hearings conducted by special inquiry officers; it does not cover discretionary determinations made by district directors or other immigration officials acting administratively rather than quasi-judicially. This decision clarified that federal courts' jurisdiction over immigration matters is limited as defined by Congress in INA's provisions – they cannot review all actions taken under its authority unless explicitly authorized.

In the dissenting opinion for Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice Fortas argued that the majority's interpretation of Section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act was too narrow. He contended that this section should be understood to grant jurisdiction to courts of appeals over all final orders from deportation proceedings, not just those made during a proceeding conducted under Section 242(b). The justice believed that such an interpretation would better align with Congress' intent when it enacted this provision - which was to streamline judicial review in immigration cases by channelizing direct review of administrative orders into one court system (the Courts of Appeals), thereby avoiding unnecessary delay caused by district court litigation. In his view, limiting appellate jurisdiction only to decisions rendered during formal deportation hearings unnecessarily complicates matters and frustrates legislative purpose.