In the case of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Bryant, Administrator in 1929, the U.S Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving an accident that occurred at a railway crossing. The plaintiff's decedent was killed when his vehicle collided with one of the defendant’s trains. The trial court found for the plaintiff and awarded damages based on negligence by both parties involved - contributory negligence by the deceased and gross negligence by employees of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company who were operating its train. However, upon appeal to Virginia's highest court, it held that under state law there could be no recovery if there was any contributory negligence from decedent regardless of how grossly negligent other party might have been; hence reversed judgment for new trial where only issue would be whether or not deceased had been guilty of any degree of contributory negligence. The U.S Supreme Court affirmed this decision stating that while federal courts may set aside verdicts they deem excessive due to passion or prejudice influencing jury decisions, they do not possess power to review judgments made solely on state laws unless such application infringes upon Federal Constitution rights which wasn't applicable here.

The dissenting opinion in the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company v. Bryant case argued that the majority's decision to reverse and remand the case was incorrect, as it failed to consider important aspects of negligence law. The dissent pointed out that there were clear indications of negligence on part of the railway company which led to Bryant’s death, such as failing to provide a safe workplace or adequate training for employees working around dangerous machinery. It also criticized how much weight was given by the majority towards whether or not Bryant had assumed risk by continuing his employment with knowledge about these dangers, arguing this should not absolve an employer from their duty of care responsibilities. Furthermore, they disagreed with how evidence was interpreted and believed there were sufficient grounds for upholding original judgment without need for retrial.