In the case of Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the United States had the right to impose a tax on the railway company for the transportation of passengers and freight. The railway company argued that the tax was unconstitutional because it violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private property for public use without just compensation. The Supreme Court held that the tax was constitutional. The Court reasoned that the tax was not a taking of private property for public use, but rather a legitimate exercise of the government's power to tax. The Court noted that the tax was imposed on the railway company for the privilege of engaging in the business of transporting passengers and freight, and that the tax was not so onerous as to amount to a taking of private property for public use. The Court also held that the tax was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court reasoned that the tax was imposed on all railway companies in the same manner, and that the tax was not discriminatory in nature. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the tax imposed on the railway company was constitutional and did not violate the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company v. United States, arguing that Congress had no authority to pass a law requiring railway companies to pay for damages caused by their negligence. He argued that such a law would be an unconstitutional exercise of power because it would interfere with the contractual rights of railroad companies and deprive them of property without due process or just compensation. Furthermore, he argued that if Congress could pass such laws then they could also impose other regulations on private businesses which would violate the Constitution's protection against government interference in private business affairs. Justice Field concluded his dissent by stating that while he agreed with the majority opinion regarding liability for damages resulting from negligence, he believed this should be addressed through contract negotiations between parties rather than through legislation passed by Congress.