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In the case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Clark in 1899, the U.S Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving land ownership and railway rights-of-way. The plaintiff, Clark, owned a piece of land that was bisected by the defendant's railroad tracks which had been laid before he acquired his property. When Clark attempted to build across these tracks for better access to his lands on either side, the railway company objected and sought an injunction against him from doing so without their permission or paying them compensation. The court held that while railroads do have certain rights over their right-of-way through private properties under federal law (the Act of March 3rd), those rights are not absolute nor exclusive; they must be balanced with reasonable use by property owners whose lands are divided by such railways. Therefore it was decided that as long as Clark’s construction did not interfere with safe operation of trains or maintenance work on track infrastructure then he could proceed without needing consent from or payment to the railway company.
In the dissenting opinion for the case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Clark, Justice Harlan argued that the court majority had erred in its interpretation and application of law regarding railway companies' liability for damages caused by fires spread from their locomotives. He contended that under Minnesota state law, a railway company could be held liable if it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that sparks or cinders from its engines started a fire resulting in property damage - even without evidence of negligence on part of the company. The burden to prove this lay with plaintiff but once established, defendant's responsibility was absolute unless they could demonstrate extraordinary circumstances which would absolve them from blame such as lightning strikes or acts by third parties causing similar fires simultaneously. In his view, lower courts correctly applied these principles and hence their judgments should have been upheld.