In the case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Lowell in 1893, the U.S Supreme Court ruled on a dispute involving land rights and railway construction. The plaintiff, Lowell, owned property that was bisected by tracks laid down by the defendant's predecessor company without proper compensation or legal right to do so. When ownership of the railroad changed hands to Chicago, Milwaukee & St.Paul Railway Company (CM&SPRC), they continued using these tracks despite protests from Lowell who sought an injunction against their use and damages for trespassing. The court held that while CM&SPRC had no original right to lay down tracks on Lowell’s property due to lack of formal agreement or payment made by its predecessor company; however it did acquire a prescriptive easement over time through continuous usage without objection from previous owners before Lowell acquired his title. Therefore, although CM&SPRC were liable for damages incurred since acquisition by Mr.Lowell due to trespassing; they could not be enjoined from continuing operations as they had gained lawful possession via this prescriptive easement.

In the dissenting opinion for Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Lowell, Justice Brewer argued that the majority's decision was incorrect because it failed to consider the full implications of its ruling on interstate commerce and federal jurisdiction over such matters. He contended that if a state could regulate rates within its borders even when those rates affected interstate travel, then every state along a railway line could potentially impose different regulations and fees which would create chaos in terms of logistics and pricing structures across states lines. This would undermine the purpose of having federal oversight over interstate commerce as provided by Congress under their constitutional powers. Furthermore, he disagreed with how broadly the court interpreted 'direct' effect on trade or commerce among several states; arguing instead for a narrower interpretation where only actions directly affecting goods crossing state lines should be considered an interference with interstate commerce.