In the case of Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company v. United States, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the United States had the right to impose a tax on the railway company for the transportation of passengers and freight. The railway company argued that the tax was unconstitutional because it violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking private property for public use without just compensation. The Supreme Court held that the tax was constitutional. The Court reasoned that the tax was not a taking of private property for public use, but rather a legitimate exercise of the government's power to tax. The Court also noted that the tax was not so onerous as to constitute a taking of private property for public use. The Court concluded that the tax was a valid exercise of the government's power to tax and did not violate the Fifth Amendment. The Court's decision in this case established that the government has the power to impose taxes on private entities for the transportation of passengers and freight. The decision also established that such taxes do not constitute a taking of private property for public use, as long as they are not so onerous as to constitute a taking.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company v. United States. He argued that the majority's decision was contrary to both precedent and sound public policy because it allowed a railroad company to be held liable for damages caused by its negligence even though it had not been given notice of any defect or danger on its property prior to the incident giving rise to those damages. Justice Field reasoned that such liability would impose an unreasonable burden on railroads, as they could not possibly inspect their entire lines every day for potential defects or dangers without incurring significant costs and delays in service delivery; thus, he concluded that requiring them to do so would be unfair and unjustified under existing law. Furthermore, Justice Field noted that Congress had never intended for railroads' liability in these cases to extend beyond what is reasonable under common law principles of negligence; therefore, he believed the majority's ruling should have been overturned as being inconsistent with congressional intent regarding this issue.