In the case of Chicago v. Taylor, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a city ordinance in Chicago was constitutional. The ordinance in question prohibited the sale of certain types of goods, including coal, wood, and hay, within the city limits. The plaintiff, Taylor, was a resident of Chicago who had been charged with violating the ordinance. He argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated his right to due process of law. The Supreme Court agreed with Taylor, ruling that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was too vague and did not provide sufficient notice of what was prohibited. The Court held that the ordinance was too vague and did not provide sufficient notice of what was prohibited. The Court also held that the ordinance was an unreasonable exercise of the city's police power and was therefore unconstitutional. The Court's decision in this case established the principle that a law must be sufficiently clear and specific in order to be constitutional. This principle has been applied in many subsequent cases, and it remains an important part of constitutional law today.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Chicago v. Taylor, arguing that the majority's decision was based on a misapplication of existing law and an incorrect interpretation of the facts. He argued that under Illinois state law, which governed this case, it was not necessary for a party to prove actual damages in order to recover nominal damages; rather, they were entitled to such relief as long as their rights had been violated. Furthermore, he noted that there was evidence presented at trial indicating that Taylor had suffered some injury due to Chicago's actions - namely his inability to use certain streets within city limits - and thus should have been awarded nominal damages regardless of whether or not he could prove any specific amount of harm caused by those actions. In conclusion Justice Field maintained that since Taylor had proven his legal right had been infringed upon by Chicago's ordinance prohibiting him from using certain streets within its boundaries without paying a fee first, he should be allowed recovery even if no actual damage could be demonstrated beyond what would normally accompany such an infringement.