In the case of Chicago v. Tebbetts, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a city ordinance that prohibited the sale of certain types of goods on Sundays was constitutional. The ordinance in question was passed by the City of Chicago in 1871 and prohibited the sale of certain types of goods, including “spirituous liquors,” on Sundays. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance was constitutional. The Court reasoned that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s police power, which is the power of a government to regulate activities within its jurisdiction for the public health, safety, and welfare. The Court noted that the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the City’s police power and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process. The Court also held that the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of the free exercise of religion. The Court reasoned that the ordinance was a general law that applied to all persons and did not single out any particular religious group or practice. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the City of Chicago’s ordinance prohibiting the sale of certain types of goods on Sundays was constitutional. The Court reasoned that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s police power and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process or the First Amendment’s guarantee of the free exercise of religion.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Chicago v. Tebetts, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that a municipality cannot be held liable for damages caused by its officers when they are acting outside of their authority or jurisdiction. In this case, he noted that the city had no control over the actions of its police officer who arrested Tebetts without a warrant and thus could not be held responsible for any resulting damages. Furthermore, Justice Field pointed out that it is well-established law that municipalities can only be held liable if they have authorized or ratified an act committed by one of their agents; since there was no evidence here showing such authorization or ratification, he concluded that liability should not attach to Chicago in this instance.