In Chittenden et al. v. Brewster et al., the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought by citizens of one state against citizens of another, when the cause of action arose in the latter's home state. The plaintiffs argued that under Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution they were entitled to bring their suit in federal court and not be subject to a local law which would have barred them from doing so. The defendants countered that since this case did not involve any controversy between two or more states nor any other matter specified by Article III as being within federal judicial power, it should remain with the courts of their own state for resolution. After careful consideration, Chief Justice Chase concluded that while Congress has authority to regulate such matters through legislation passed pursuant to its powers granted under Article IV and VI; absent such legislation there is no basis for extending federal jurisdiction beyond what is expressly provided for in Article III itself - thus leaving these cases within exclusive control of each respective State’s judiciary system.

In Chittenden et al. v. Brewster et al., the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought by citizens of one state against citizens of another in which the amount in controversy exceeded $500, as required by diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1332(a). The majority held that it did not have such jurisdiction because Congress had not given consent for suits between two states' citizens to be heard in federal courts and thus, only state courts could hear these cases. However, Justice Field dissented from this opinion on the grounds that Congress's silence should be interpreted as implied consent since there were no explicit prohibitions preventing such actions from being tried in federal court and allowing them would further justice without infringing upon any constitutional rights or powers granted to either party involved. He argued that if Congress intended otherwise they would have made their intentions clear through legislation rather than leaving it up to interpretation based on their silence alone