This case was between William Christy, the plaintiff in error, and Lodovick P. Alford, administrator of Henry D. Bullard who had passed away. The dispute centered around a promissory note that Christy had given to Bullard for $1,000 with interest at 8 percent per annum from October 1st 1848 until paid off. It was agreed upon by both parties that if the debt wasn’t paid within one year then it would be considered due immediately and payable on demand along with an additional 10 percent penalty fee added onto the total amount owed. When Bullard died before payment could be made his estate became responsible for collecting what was owed to him but they were unable to do so as there were no assets available from which money could be taken out of or used towards paying off this debt; therefore Alford sued Christy in order to collect what he believed he was entitled too under their agreement even though there weren’t any funds available from which payment could have been made when demanded by him initially after Bullards death occurred prior to full repayment being completed . Ultimately however Supreme Court ruled against Alford stating that since no actual damages had been suffered due to nonpayment then he couldn't legally pursue collection efforts anymore than what already existed at time of death meaning all claims against Christy must now cease completely without further action being taken either way by either party involved in this matter going forward

In the case of William Christy v. Lodovick P. Alford, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a contract between two parties could be enforced when one party had died before it was completed. The majority opinion held that contracts cannot be enforced after death, as they are not binding on an estate and do not pass from one generation to another. However, Justice McLean dissented from this decision and argued that if both parties had agreed upon terms prior to death then those terms should still be enforceable in court even though the deceased party is no longer alive. He reasoned that since there was evidence of mutual assent between both parties at the time of execution, it would be unjust for either side to escape their obligations under such circumstances without any legal consequence or remedy available for breach of contract by either side.