Christy v. Pridgeon was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, John Christy, was held in a federal prison in the state of Georgia. Christy sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, which was denied by the state court judge, William Pridgeon. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal prerogative, and that the state court did not have the authority to interfere with the federal government's power to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a fundamental right, and that the state court should not be allowed to interfere with the federal government's power to protect this right. The Court's decision in Christy v. Pridgeon established that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. This decision has been cited in numerous cases since, and has been used to support the idea that the federal government has the power to protect the fundamental right of habeas corpus.

In Christy v. Pridgeon, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought by a non-resident plaintiff against a resident defendant in which the cause of action arose outside of the state. The majority opinion held that such jurisdiction did not exist and dismissed the case. However, Justice Field dissented from this decision on two grounds: first, he argued that under Article III of the Constitution, Congress has exclusive power to regulate cases between citizens of different states; second, he maintained that even if there were no constitutional impediment to allowing states to exercise such authority over out-of-state causes of action involving their own citizens as defendants, it would be unwise for them do so because it could lead to conflicting judgments and create confusion among litigants who may have valid claims in multiple jurisdictions. He concluded his dissent with an admonition that “the wisdom and justice” required by these considerations should be taken into account before any further attempts are made at extending state court jurisdiction beyond its traditional limits.