Term: 2021
Docket: 20-1029
City Of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising Of Texas Inc
- Pro
20-1029 AUSTIN V. REAGAN NATIONAL ADVERTISING DECISION BELOW: 972 F.3d 696 CERT. GRANTED 6/28/2021 QUESTION PRESENTED: Austin sign code provisions distinguish between on-premise and off-premise signs based solely on location. From this distinction—and unrelated to what message is conveyed—the sign code establishes a technology-based rule about how a sign’s message may be conveyed. On-premise signs may be digitized, and off-premise signs may not. Billboard companies sought permits to digitize 84 billboards—off-premise signs—and sued the city when the permits were denied. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the First Amendment invalidated the challenged provisions, holding that the on-premise/off- premise distinction is content-based under Reed v. Town of Gilbert and fails the strict scrutiny test. The question presented is: Is the city code’s distinction between on- and off-premise signs a facially unconstitutional content- based regulation under Reed? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 19-50354
In City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc., the Supreme Court considered whether a city ordinance that prohibited billboards within 660 feet of certain highways violated the First Amendment. The court held that it did not because the ordinance was content-neutral and served an important governmental interest in preserving aesthetic appeal along public roads. Furthermore, there were ample alternative channels for communication available to billboard companies such as digital advertising and other forms of outdoor advertising. As such, this case serves as an example of how cities can regulate speech without violating constitutional rights when they have legitimate interests at stake and provide reasonable alternatives for expression.
. In the case of City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc., the Supreme Court of Texas issued a dissenting opinion. The majority opinion held that the City of Austin’s ordinance prohibiting the placement of billboards within the city limits was constitutional. The dissenting opinion argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech. The dissent argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. The dissent argued that the ordinance was overly broad and did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent argued that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest because it did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent also argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. The dissent argued that the ordinance was overly broad and did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent argued that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest because it did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. The dissent argued that the ordinance was overly broad and did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent argued that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest because it did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. The dissent argued that the ordinance was overly broad and did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent argued that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest because it did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent argued that the ordinance was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest. The dissent argued that the ordinance was overly broad and did not take into account the fact that some billboards may be beneficial to the public. The dissent argued that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to serve a
