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16-1495 HAYS, KANSAS V. VOGT DECISION BELOW: 844 F.3d 1235 JUSTICE GORSUCH TOOK NO PART IN THE CONSIDERATION OR DECISION OF THIS CASE. DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. CERT. GRANTED 9/28/2017 QUESTION PRESENTED: The Self-Incrimination Clause provides that “[ n]o person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” As the court below recognized, a "circuit split [has] developed" over whether certain pretrial uses of compelled statements force a person "to be a witness against himself” within the meaning of that provision. Pet. App. 6a. The question presented is: Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 15-3266
The case City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt (2017) revolves around the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when statements are used at a probable cause hearing but not at a criminal trial. Matthew Jack Dwight Vogt was a police officer in Hays who disclosed during an interview for another job that he had kept a knife obtained while working as an officer. The information led to his being charged with two felonies, although these were later dismissed due to lack of evidence. However, Vogt claimed his self-incriminating statements were used against him unlawfully in pretrial proceedings and filed suit against the city and several officials under 42 U.S.C §1983 for violating his Fifth Amendment rights by using compelled statements during pretrial proceedings without offering immunity from prosecution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among lower courts about whether the Self-Incrimination Clause protects individuals from being compelled to incriminate themselves only in criminal cases or also in probable cause hearings.
The Supreme Court did not issue a full opinion in the case of City of Hays, Kansas v. Vogt, 2017 because it was dismissed as improvidently granted. However, Justice Gorsuch took the unusual step to write an opinion concurring with this dismissal. He argued that there were factual disputes that needed resolution before constitutional questions could be addressed and suggested lower courts had failed to fully consider these issues. While this is not technically a dissenting opinion since he agreed with the majority's decision to dismiss the case, his written concurrence expressed dissatisfaction with how lower courts handled it.