In the 1931 case of Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a ferry company operating between Maryland and Virginia was not exempt from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, despite its argument that it only operated within state waters. The court held that because these operations were part of an interstate transportation system and had significant effects on interstate commerce, they fell within Congress's power to regulate. This decision reinforced previous rulings affirming broad congressional authority over all forms of interstate commerce, including those conducted by private companies.

In the dissenting opinion for the Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States case, it was argued that Congress did not have constitutional authority to regulate or control ferry rates between two points within a state, even if those ferries used navigable waters of the United States. The dissenting justices believed that this regulation infringed upon states' rights and exceeded federal jurisdiction as outlined in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. They maintained that while Congress could regulate interstate commerce on navigable waters, it should not extend its power to intrastate commerce unless such activities had a direct effect on interstate trade or navigation which they felt was not demonstrated in this case.