Term: 2012
Docket: 11-1025
James R. Clapper, Jr., Director Of National Intelligence, Et Al., Petitioners v. Amnesty International Usa Et Al.
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11-1025 CLAPPER V. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA DECISION BELOW: 638 F. 3d 118 JUSTICE KAGAN TOOK NO PART. CERT. GRANTED 5/21/2012 QUESTION PRESENTED: Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. 1881a (Supp. II 2008)-referred to here as Section 1881a - allows the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to authorize jointly the "targeting of [non-United States] persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States" to acquire "foreign intelligence information," normally with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's prior approval of targeting and other procedures. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(a), (b), (g)(2) and (i)(3); cf. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(c) (2). Respondents are United States persons who may not be targeted for surveillance under Section 1881a. Respondents filed this action on the day that Section 1881a was enacted, seeking both a declaration that Section 1881a is unconstitutional and an injunction permanently enjoining any foreign-intelligence surveillance from being conducted under Section 1881a. The question presented is: Whether respondents lack Article III standing to seek prospective relief because they proffered no evidence that the United States would imminently acquire their international communications using Section 1881a-authorized surveillance and did not show that an injunction prohibiting Section 1881a-authorized surveillance would likely redress their purported injuries. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 09-4112-cv
The U.S. Supreme Court case Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 2012, revolved around the constitutionality of a federal law that expanded the government's ability to monitor international communications involving Americans. The plaintiffs - a group of attorneys, journalists and human rights organizations led by Amnesty International - argued that their communication with foreign contacts was likely being intercepted under this law which violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, the court ruled in favor of James R. Clapper Jr., then Director of National Intelligence, stating that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not prove they had been or would certainly be monitored under this legislation; any harm incurred was speculative at best as it relied on a chain of assumptions without concrete evidence.
In the dissenting opinion for Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, Justice Breyer argued that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because they could reasonably assume their communications would be intercepted under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). He reasoned that given their professional activities and relationships with likely surveillance targets overseas, it was not speculative but rather highly probable that their conversations would be monitored. Furthermore, he contended these fears were not hypothetical as they had already incurred significant costs in order to protect sensitive information from potential interception. Therefore, according to Justice Breyer's view, this case should have been allowed to proceed on its merits rather than being dismissed due to lack of standing.
