Clark v. Wooster was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who was being held in a federal prison. The case arose when a prisoner, William Clark, was held in a federal prison in Ohio. Clark sought a writ of habeas corpus from the state court, claiming that he was being held in violation of the Constitution. The state court granted the writ, and the federal government appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner held in a federal prison. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy, and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal government's authority to imprison individuals. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy that could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the merits of the underlying conviction. The Court's decision in Clark v. Wooster established that state courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners held in federal prisons. The decision also clarified the scope of the writ of habeas corpus, and established that it could only be used to challenge the legality of a person's detention, and not to challenge the merits of the underlying conviction.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Clark v. Wooster, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He argued that under prior decisions of this Court, a contract for personal services could not be enforced against a third party who had no knowledge or notice of such agreement when they purchased property from one of the parties involved in the contract. In this case, he noted that there was no evidence presented at trial indicating that Wooster had any knowledge or notice of Clark's claim before purchasing his interest in the land from him; thus, it should have been held as invalid against her. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that even if she did have some kind of actual or constructive notice regarding Clark's claim on part of the land before buying it from him, then she should only be liable for what she paid for her share - not more than its fair market value - rather than being responsible for all damages resulting from breach by both parties combined as determined by majority opinion.