In the case of Coal Company v. Blatchford, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to decide whether a coal company had the right to sue a former employee for damages caused by his breach of contract. The employee, Blatchford, had been hired by the coal company to work in their mines. He had signed a contract agreeing to work for the company for a certain period of time, but he had left the job before the contract was up. The coal company argued that Blatchford had breached the contract and was therefore liable for damages. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the coal company, finding that Blatchford had indeed breached the contract and was liable for damages. The Court held that the coal company had the right to sue Blatchford for damages, and that the damages should be determined by a jury. The Court also noted that the damages should be based on the amount of money the coal company had lost due to Blatchford's breach of contract. In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruled that the coal company had the right to sue Blatchford for damages caused by his breach of contract. The Court held that the damages should be determined by a jury, and should be based on the amount of money the coal company had lost due to Blatchford's breach of contract.

In the case of Coal Company v. Blatchford, Justice Field delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority's decision was contrary to established precedent and would lead to an unjust result. He noted that under prior decisions of the Supreme Court, when Congress had granted exclusive rights or privileges for public purposes, those rights could not be taken away without compensation unless there was clear language from Congress indicating its intent to do so. In this case, however, no such language existed and thus it should have been assumed that Congress intended for these exclusive mining rights to remain intact until they were explicitly revoked by law. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that even if one accepted the majority's interpretation of Congressional intent as valid - namely that all private property is subject only at any time to be resumed by government authority - then it still did not follow logically nor legally that individuals who held such property before its resumption should receive no compensation whatsoever for their losses due solely to governmental action. As such he concluded his dissent with a strong argument against what he viewed as an unfair ruling: "It cannot be justly maintained," wrote Field "that persons holding valuable franchises may have them suddenly snatched away without indemnity."