In Stephen Cocke, for the use of the Commercial Bank of Columbus, Mississippi v. Joseph A. Halsey and others, the Supreme Court considered a case involving an action on a promissory note issued by two individuals to secure payment for goods purchased from them. The bank had sued in state court to recover on this note but was unsuccessful due to its failure to prove that it held title or interest in the note at issue when it brought suit. On appeal before the Supreme Court, counsel argued that under Mississippi law at that time, if any party other than those who signed a contract has possession of it with intent to hold as security for debt or demand then they are entitled to sue upon such instrument even without proof of title or interest therein when bringing suit. In ruling against this argument and affirming lower court’s decision dismissing plaintiff’s claim against defendants based on lack of evidence regarding ownership rights over promissory note at issue ,the Supreme Court held that although mere possession may be sufficient evidence where there is no dispute between parties concerning ownership rights over property being claimed; however here since there was dispute between parties concerning ownership rights over said property therefore mere possession would not suffice as evidence proving same .

In Stephen Cocke, for the use of the Commercial Bank of Columbus, Mississippi v. Joseph A. Halsey and Others (1842), Justice McLean delivered a dissenting opinion that argued against the majority's decision to reverse a judgment in favor of plaintiff Stephen Cocke. The case concerned an action brought by Cocke against defendants Halsey and others on behalf of himself and other creditors who had loaned money to defendant William Blythe prior to his death. In his dissent, McLean noted that although there was no dispute as to whether or not Blythe had died insolvent with debts exceeding assets at the time he passed away, it was clear from evidence presented during trial that some portion of those debts were due before his death while others became due after he died; thus making them subject to different legal considerations under state law which should have been taken into account when determining liability for repayment among all parties involved in this case. He concluded by stating that since these facts were established beyond reasonable doubt during trial proceedings but ignored by both lower courts as well as Supreme Court justices in their decisions regarding this matter, it would be unjust if they did not take such matters into consideration when rendering their final verdicts on this case going forward.