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In the 1960 case of Cohen v. Hurley, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer could be disbarred for refusing to testify in an investigation into his own professional conduct on grounds of self-incrimination without violating his Fifth Amendment rights. The court held that New York State's decision to disbar Martin H. Cohen did not constitute a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because he refused to cooperate with an inquiry by the state's grievance committee, which was investigating allegations against him regarding misappropriation of clients' funds and other misconducts. His refusal was based on invoking his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under both federal and state law, but this argument was rejected by majority opinion led by Justice John Harlan who stated that while lawyers have every right to invoke their Fifth Amendment privileges in criminal proceedings, they cannot do so when it comes to inquiries about their fitness as members of bar associations.
In the dissenting opinion for Cohen v. Hurley, Justice Hugo Black argued that a lawyer should not be disbarred without being given an opportunity to defend himself in court. He believed that due process of law was violated when Cohen was disbarred by the New York courts simply because he refused to testify on grounds of self-incrimination during a disciplinary proceeding. According to Justice Black, this refusal did not constitute professional misconduct and therefore could not justify disbarring him from practicing law. Furthermore, he contended that lawyers have the same Fifth Amendment rights as other citizens and these rights should be respected even in disciplinary proceedings against them.