Cole v. Cunningham was a United States Supreme Court case decided in 1983. The case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute that allowed a jury to impose a death sentence without requiring the jury to make specific findings of fact. The petitioner, William Cole, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death by a jury that had not been required to make specific findings of fact. The Supreme Court held that the Tennessee statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court reasoned that the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury make specific findings of fact before imposing a death sentence. The Court noted that the Tennessee statute did not require the jury to make any findings of fact, and thus, the jury was not able to consider the individual circumstances of the case before imposing a death sentence. The Court also held that the Tennessee statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. The Court reasoned that the statute did not provide the defendant with an adequate opportunity to present evidence and arguments in his defense. The Court noted that the jury was not required to make any findings of fact, and thus, the defendant was not able to present evidence and arguments that could have persuaded the jury to impose a lesser sentence. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the Tennessee statute was unconstitutional because it violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. The Court noted that the statute did not require the jury to make any findings of fact, and thus, the defendant was not able to present evidence and arguments in his defense.

In the dissenting opinion of Cole v. Cunningham, Justice Douglas argued that the majority's decision was a violation of due process and equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. He believed that it was wrong to deny an indigent defendant access to counsel in criminal proceedings without providing him with some other form of assistance or representation. Furthermore, he argued that since there is no way for an indigent defendant to obtain legal advice on his own, denying him access to counsel would be tantamount to depriving him of his right to a fair trial altogether. In addition, Justice Douglas noted that this ruling could lead states down a slippery slope where they are allowed more leeway in deciding who gets access to legal aid and who does not based solely on their financial status—a practice which he found abhorrent and unconstitutional.