Collins Company v. Coes is a Supreme Court case from 1876 that dealt with the issue of whether a contract between two parties was valid. The case involved a contract between Collins Company and Coes, in which Collins Company agreed to pay Coes a certain amount of money for the use of certain machinery. Coes argued that the contract was invalid because it was not in writing, while Collins Company argued that the contract was valid because it had been orally agreed upon. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Collins Company, finding that the contract was valid and enforceable. The Court held that the contract was binding because it had been agreed upon by both parties, and that the lack of a written agreement did not invalidate the contract. The Court also noted that the parties had acted in good faith and that the contract had been performed in accordance with its terms. This ruling established the precedent that oral contracts are valid and enforceable, provided that the parties have acted in good faith and that the contract has been performed in accordance with its terms.

In the case of Collins Company v. Coes, Justice Harlan delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority had misinterpreted and misapplied the law. He believed that Congress did not intend for employers to be held liable for injuries caused by their employees' negligence when they were acting outside of their scope of employment. In this particular case, Justice Harlan felt that there was no evidence to suggest that Coes was acting within his scope as an employee at the time of injury and thus should not have been held responsible under respondeat superior doctrine. Furthermore, he noted that if employers were indeed liable in such cases then it would lead to “absurd results” where employers could be found liable even though they had taken all reasonable precautions against accidents occurring on their premises or with respect to any activity conducted by them or through its agents. Thus, Justice Harlan concluded his dissent by stating his belief that Congress never intended for such liability and thus it should not apply in this instance either.