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The Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor case in 1985 revolved around the issue of whether or not the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) had constitutional authority to adjudicate state common law counterclaims. The dispute began when Schor, a customer, filed a complaint against ContiCommodity Services Inc., a broker, with the CFTC for alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act and regulations. In response, ContiCommodity filed a counterclaim for money owed on margin calls under state common law which was upheld by CFTC and later affirmed by Court of Appeals. However, upon reaching Supreme Court it held that while Article III forbids Congress from assigning traditional judicial powers to non-Article III courts in certain situations; this prohibition does not apply here as parties voluntarily submitted their claims to agency adjudication and thus waived their right to have these claims decided by an Article III court. Furthermore, allowing CFTC's limited exercise of jurisdiction did not threaten structural integrity or separation-of-powers principles inherent in Article III.
In the dissenting opinion for Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's decision violated Article III of the Constitution by allowing a non-Article III tribunal (the CFTC) to adjudicate state common law counterclaims. He contended that this was an encroachment on judicial power and undermined the separation of powers principle. The justice also expressed concern about potential bias in administrative agencies due to their regulatory roles, which could compromise impartiality in dispute resolution. Furthermore, he criticized the majority's reliance on consent as a basis for jurisdiction because it overlooked how parties might feel compelled to submit to agency adjudication out of fear or necessity rather than genuine consent.