In the case of Connecticut Board of Pardons et al. v. Dumschat et al., 1980, Thomas Dumschat, a convicted murderer serving a life sentence in Connecticut state prison, claimed that he had an entitlement to commutation consideration and that his repeated denials violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection under the law. The Supreme Court ruled against him in a 6-3 decision stating that there is no constitutional or inherent right for any prisoner to have their sentence commuted by the state's pardon board. The court held that since clemency is traditionally granted out of mercy or grace, it cannot be demanded as a matter of right; therefore its denial does not constitute deprivation without due process.

In the dissenting opinion for Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, Justice Brennan argued that a prisoner's expectation of commutation or pardon should be considered as part of his sentence and therefore protected by due process. He contended that because the state had established a system where prisoners could apply for clemency after serving a certain portion of their sentences, it created an expectancy interest in those applications being fairly reviewed. This expectancy was not merely speculative but based on historical data showing regular grants of clemency to eligible inmates. Therefore, he believed this case involved more than just unilateral hope; it involved an element of entitlement grounded in state law and practice which required constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.