In the case of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 2004, the U.S Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a private party who has not been sued under §9607(a) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), can obtain contribution from other liable parties under §9613(f)(1). The dispute arose when Aviall Services purchased property from Cooper Industries that was contaminated due to prior industrial activities by Cooper. After voluntarily cleaning up the site without any lawsuit or administrative order against them, Aviall sought recovery for cleanup costs from Cooper under CERCLA's provision allowing those who have incurred cleanup costs to seek contribution from others responsible for contamination. However, the court ruled in favor of Cooper Industries stating that a party could only seek such contributions if they themselves had been sued under CERCLA - something which hadn't happened with Aviall services.

In the dissenting opinion for Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Section 113(f)(1) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). She argued that this section should allow a potentially responsible party to seek contribution from other liable parties at any time, not just after being sued under Sections 106 or 107(a). The majority’s reading would create an odd procedure where a volunteer who cleaned up contamination could only sue others involved if they themselves were first sued. This contradicts CERCLA’s aim to encourage voluntary cleanups by allowing cost recovery against other polluters. Furthermore, she pointed out inconsistencies in their interpretation when compared with related provisions in CERCLA and suggested that it was more logical to interpret Section 113(f)(1) as providing a general right of contribution available during or following any civil action under CERCLA.