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15-1262 McCRORY V. HARRIS DECISION BELOW: 2016 WL 482052 QUESTION PRESENTED: The three-judge court below held that North Carolina Congressional Districts 1 ("CD 1") and 12 ("CD 12") were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. The court's ruling traps North Carolina between the "competing hazards of liability" of compliance with the Voting Rights Act ("VRA'') and avoiding unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. As to CD 1, the court accomplished this result by presuming racial predominance from North Carolina's adherence to Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) ("Strickland") and then analyzing the State's evidence as if North Carolina was a VRA Section 2 plaintiff instead of a state defending against future VRA claims. As to CD 12, the court trapped North Carolina by ignoring this Court's specific standard for proof that "race rather than politics" predominated: plaintiffs had to prove "at the least" that the legislature could have "achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional redistricting principles" yet bring about "significantly greater racial balance" than CD 12. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) ("Cromartie II'). In doing so, the three-judge court relied on evidence to find racial predominance that this Court repeatedly rejected in Cromartie II. Judge Osteen dissented from the three-judge court's ruling on CD 12. The questions presented are: 1. Did the court below err in presuming racial predominance from North Carolina’s reasonable reliance on this Court’s holding in Strickland that a district created to ensure that African Americans have an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidate of choice complies with the VRA if it contains a numerical majority of African Americans? 2. Did the court below err in applying a standard of review that required the State to demonstrate its construction of CD 1 was "actually necessary" under the VRA instead of simply showing it had "good reasons" to believe the district, as created, was needed to foreclose future vote dilution claims? 3. Did the court below err in relieving plaintiffs of their burden to prove "race rather than politics" predominated with proof of an alternative plan that achieves the legislature's political goals, is comparably consistent with traditional redistricting principles, and brings about greater racial balance than the challenged districts? 4. Regardless of any other error, was the three-judge court's finding of racial gerrymandering violations based on clearly erroneous fact-finding? 5. Did the court below err in failing to dismiss plaintiffs' claims as being barred by claim preclusion or issue preclusion? 6. In the interests of judicial comity and federalism, should the Court order full briefing and oral argument to resolve the split between the court below and the North Carolina Supreme Court which reached the opposite result in a case raising identical claims? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 1:13-cv-949 JURISDICTION NOTED 6/27/2016
The U.S. Supreme Court case Cooper v. Harris (2016) revolved around the issue of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's redistricting plan following the 2010 census. The state argued that it had redrawn two congressional districts to comply with non-discrimination requirements under the Voting Rights Act, but residents claimed this was a pretext for unconstitutional racial gerrymandering intended to dilute African-American voting power by packing these voters into fewer districts. In a unanimous decision, the court ruled against North Carolina and held that race had been improperly used as a predominant factor in drawing district lines without narrowly tailoring use of race to further compelling interest, thus violating equal protection principles under Fourteenth Amendment.
In the dissenting opinion for Cooper v. Harris, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, argued that the majority misapplied precedent in concluding that race predominated in District 12's redrawing. They contended that there was a legitimate political explanation for the new district lines - to pack Democrats into one district so as to make surrounding districts safer for Republicans - which should have been given more weight. The dissenters also criticized the majority’s reliance on statistical evidence over legislative intent or other factors when determining whether racial gerrymandering occurred. Furthermore, they disagreed with how much deference was given to lower courts' findings of fact and believed this could set a dangerous precedent moving forward.