In the 1960 case of Coppola v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled on a matter concerning self-incrimination and due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The defendant, Frank Coppola, was convicted for murder in Virginia state court and sentenced to death. He appealed his conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court arguing that he had been denied his constitutional right against self-incrimination when he was forced by police officers to reenact parts of his crime while being filmed without having an attorney present or being informed about his rights beforehand. The Supreme Court upheld Coppola's conviction with a 5-4 majority vote stating that since no confession or incriminating statements were made during this filming session, there was no violation of Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination as it did not involve any "testimonial" evidence (i.e., verbal communication). Furthermore, they found that even if there had been a violation of these protections at some point during investigation proceedings prior to trial - which wasn't clear from available records - such error would have been harmless beyond reasonable doubt given overwhelming independent evidence supporting guilt.

In the dissenting opinion for Coppola v. United States, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's decision to uphold Coppola's conviction was inconsistent with previous Supreme Court rulings regarding coerced confessions. He contended that Coppola had been subjected to psychological pressure and manipulation by law enforcement officers during his interrogation, which lasted over 14 hours without a break. This treatment, he believed, violated Coppola’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and due process of law. Furthermore, Brennan criticized the majority for failing to consider whether or not this confession was voluntary in light of these circumstances - an assessment he deemed crucial given past precedents on involuntary confessions being inadmissible as evidence in court trials. In essence, Justice Brennan disagreed with the ruling because it contradicted established legal principles concerning coerced confessions and constitutional rights.