In the case of Costanzo v. Tillinghast, Commissioner of Immigration in 1932, the United States Supreme Court ruled on a matter involving immigration law and naturalization. The petitioner, Mr. Costanzo was an Italian immigrant who had been living in America for several years but never completed his naturalization process to become a U.S citizen before he left for Italy temporarily. Upon his return to the U.S., he was denied entry by immigration officials on grounds that he had lost his resident status due to absence from the country without having acquired citizenship first. The court held that despite not completing formal naturalization procedures prior to leaving America, Mr. Costanzo's intent was always clear -to permanently reside in America- as demonstrated by him establishing residence and initiating (though not completing) naturalization proceedings before departure; thus should be considered as returning after temporary visit abroad rather than seeking admission for permanent residence anew. Therefore, it concluded that Mr.Costanzo retained his legal status as an alien admitted for permanent residence even though he did not complete full citizenship requirements before leaving temporarily; hence entitled re-entry into United States under existing laws at time.

In the dissenting opinion for Costanzo v. Tillinghast, Justice Stone argued that the majority's decision to deport an immigrant based on a crime committed prior to his entry into the United States was unjust and contrary to established law. He contended that immigration laws should not be retroactively applied in such a way as they were designed primarily for prospective application. Furthermore, he emphasized that it is unfair and unreasonable to punish someone twice for the same offense by both criminal prosecution and deportation. According to him, this approach contradicts principles of justice and humanity which underpin American legal tradition. Therefore, he disagreed with the majority’s ruling upholding Mr.Costanzo’s deportation order.