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Loftin Cotton was charged with the crime of piracy for his involvement in a slave revolt aboard the brig Creole. He argued that he should not be convicted because, under international law, slaves were considered property and therefore could not commit an act of piracy. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that even though slaves were legally considered property, they still had the capacity to commit acts of piracy as defined by U.S. law since it did not require any intent or malice on their part to do so; thus Cotton's conviction was upheld. This case established precedent for future cases involving similar issues regarding slavery and criminal liability in relation to international laws governing maritime activity such as piracy or mutiny at sea.
In the case of Loftin Cotton v. The United States, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an indictment for murder that occurred on board a vessel in navigable waters. The majority opinion held that it did not have such jurisdiction and reversed the conviction. However, Justice McLean dissented from this decision and argued that states should be able to exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts committed on vessels within their boundaries or upon navigable waters adjacent thereto. He reasoned that if Congress intended otherwise they would have explicitly stated so in their legislation granting exclusive federal judicial power over crimes committed at sea or upon any other watercourse within its limits; however, no such language exists in these laws. Furthermore, he noted how allowing states to prosecute certain offenses occurring on vessels would help protect citizens from violence while also providing them with access to justice when wronged by those who are beyond reach of federal courts due to lack of territorial authority or resources necessary for prosecution elsewhere. Ultimately, Justice McLean concluded his dissent by asserting that denying state courts' ability to try cases involving maritime offenses is contrary both common sense and constitutional principles which guarantee all persons equal protection under law regardless of where they may reside or commit crime