Term: 2016
Docket: 16-369
Cty. Of Los Angeles v. Mendez
- Pro
16-369 LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CA V. MENDEZ DECISION BELOW: 815 F.3d 1178 GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTIONS 1 AND 3 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. CERT. GRANTED 12/2/2016 QUESTION PRESENTED: In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the district court concluded Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (''LASD") deputies did not use excessive force in shooting the plaintiffs in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, based upon the factors set forth by this Court in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), as the deputies reasonably feared for their safety at the time of the shooting. However, the deputies were nevertheless found liable under the "provocation" rule created by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (''Ninth Circuit"). This Court has not yet agreed or disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's "provocation" rule, but has noted the doctrine has been "sharply questioned" by other Courts of Appeals. City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 S.Ct. 1765, 1777 n.4 (2015). The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Ninth Circuit's "provocation'' rule should be barred as it conflicts with Graham v. Connor regarding the manner in which a claim of excessive force against a police officer should be determined in an action brought under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 for a violation of a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, and has been rejected by other Courts of Appeals? 2. Whether, if the "provocation" rule is upheld, the qualified immunity analysis must be tailored to require a reviewing court to determine whether every reasonable officer in the position of the defendant would have known his unlawful conduct would provoke a violent confrontation under the specific facts of the case, as this is the conduct for which the Ninth Circuit imposes constitutional liability despite a reasonable use of force under the Fourth Amendment? 3. Whether, in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an incident giving rise to a reasonable use of force is an intervening, superseding event which breaks the chain of causation from a prior, unlawful entry in violation of the Fourth Amendment? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 13-56686, 13-57072
In the case of County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2017 that law enforcement officers who use excessive force may not be held liable if they were unaware their actions violated a person's constitutional rights. The case involved Angel Mendez and Jennifer Garcia, who were shot by LA county deputies during a search for a parolee-at-large. The couple sued for damages under Section 1983, claiming violation of Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures due to lack of warrant or knock-and-announce rule before entering their dwelling. Initially, they won $4 million in damages but this was overturned on appeal as it was found that the officers could not have known their entry would provoke such violence (the "provocation rule"). In an unanimous decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court rejected this provocation rule stating it improperly allowed excessive force claims outside established Fourth Amendment standards.
In the dissenting opinion for County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's decision to discard the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule” was unnecessary and misguided. The provocation rule held officers liable if their unconstitutional actions provoked a violent response. According to Ginsburg, this case could have been resolved by simply applying established Fourth Amendment law on excessive force without needing to address or reject the provocation rule at all. She also disagreed with how the majority applied "qualified immunity," which shields government officials from being held personally liable for constitutional violations unless they clearly violated established legal principles. In her view, it was clear that entering a home without a warrant violates well-established Fourth Amendment rights; thus, she believed qualified immunity should not apply in this case.
