This Supreme Court case was between William Covington, the plaintiff in error, and David A. Comstock, the defendant in error. The dispute arose from a contract made by both parties for the sale of land located in Washington County, Maryland. Covington alleged that he had paid Comstock $1,000 as part of an agreement to purchase certain tracts of land but that Comstock failed to deliver title or deed for said lands as promised. In response to this claim by Covington against him for breach of contract and damages suffered due to non-performance on his part, Comstock filed a plea alleging payment had been received from another party prior to any agreement with Covington and thus no valid contract existed between them at all. After hearing arguments from both sides regarding their respective claims over ownership rights concerning these lands in question along with evidence presented before it on behalf of each party's position; ultimately the court found that there was indeed sufficient proof provided which established a binding legal obligation upon Comstock’s part towards fulfilling his contractual obligations under this particular transaction entered into with Covington thereby awarding judgment accordingly against him while dismissing any counterclaims raised by him during proceedings held therein .

In the case of William Covington vs. David A. Comstock, Justice McLean delivered a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. He disagreed with Chief Justice Taney's majority opinion that held that an act passed by Congress to authorize suits against states was unconstitutional because it violated state sovereignty under Article III of the Constitution. Instead, McLean argued that since this particular suit did not involve any federal question or controversy between two different states, but rather one individual suing another within a single state, then there was no need to invoke Article III as it had nothing to do with disputes between separate sovereigns. Furthermore, he noted how such acts were common practice before and after ratification of the Constitution without any objections from either side at those times; thus making them valid exercises of Congressional power even if they infringed on some aspects of state sovereignty as long as they did not violate other parts of the Constitution itself.