Questions presented
SCOTUS records, cert granted 30 Jun 2025
- This Court has held that a business commits contributory copyright infringement when it "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster infringement." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). The courts of appeals have split three ways over the scope of that ruling, developing differing standards for when it is appropriate to hold an online service provider secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by users. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it?
- Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable as a willful violator of the law-and subject to increased penalties-without proof that it knew or recklessly disregarded a high risk that its own conduct was illegal. In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit upheld an instruction allowing the jury to find willfulness if Cox knew its subscribers' conduct was illegal-without proof Cox knew its own conduct in not terminating them was illegal. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?
Opinion summary
Etalia.ai summary of the majority opinion
The case asked whether an internet service provider can be held contributorily liable for users’ copyright infringement simply because it continued providing internet access after receiving notices that certain subscriber IP addresses were linked to infringement. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Thomas, held that Cox was not contributorily liable. The Court said contributory liability requires intent that the service be used for infringement, which under the Court’s precedents can be shown only by active inducement of infringement or by selling a service tailored to infringement. Cox did neither: it did not promote infringement and instead warned, suspended, and terminated accounts, and its internet service had substantial lawful uses. The Court also rejected the argument that the Copyright Act’s DMCA safe harbor meant internet providers must otherwise face liability for serving known infringers.
Opinion written by Justice Thomas
Decided 25 Mar 2026 · Official report
Oral argument transcript
Argued 1 Dec 2025