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In Craig et al. v. Radford, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state court's decision to enforce an agreement between two parties was not subject to review by federal courts. The case arose when William Craig and others sued Thomas Radford in Virginia state court for breach of contract, alleging that he had failed to pay them money owed under a written contract. The Virginia court found in favor of Craig and his co-plaintiffs, ordering Radford to pay damages as specified in the contract. When Radford refused to comply with this order, they sought relief from the U.S Supreme Court on grounds that their rights were violated due to errors made by the lower court during trial proceedings or other irregularities related thereto; however, Chief Justice John Marshall ruled against them because he determined such matters were beyond federal judicial power and instead should be left up solely for determination by state courts alone as it pertained exclusively within their jurisdiction over contracts formed within its borders .
In Craig et al. v. Radford, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had jurisdiction over an action brought by citizens of one state against citizens of another in which the amount in controversy exceeded $500. The majority opinion held that such suits could not be maintained in any other than federal courts because they were between citizens of different states and therefore fell within the scope of Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 (the diversity clause) of the United States Constitution. Justice Johnson dissented from this ruling on two grounds: firstly, he argued that there was no express provision for such cases under Article III; secondly, he contended that if Congress intended to give exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts it would have done so explicitly rather than relying on implication or inference from general language used elsewhere in the Constitution. He concluded by asserting his belief that “it is dangerous and improper” for a court to infer powers beyond those expressly granted when doing so would limit rights otherwise enjoyed by individuals under their respective state constitutions or laws