In the 1986 case of Crawford Fitting Co. et al. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., the United States Supreme Court addressed whether federal courts could tax costs for expert witnesses in excess of the per diem attendance fee set by statute when a prevailing party is awarded costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d). The dispute arose from a patent infringement lawsuit where Crawford Fitting Company and other manufacturers were sued by J.T. Gibbons, Inc.. After winning their case, Crawford sought to recover expenses incurred due to hiring an expert witness which exceeded statutory limits. The Supreme Court held that when a prevailing party seeks reimbursement for fees paid to its own expert witnesses, a federal court is bound by the limits set out in section 1821(b) of Title 28 (which at that time was $30 per day), despite any contractual agreement otherwise between parties or rules allowing taxation of full compensation as costs under Rule 54(d). Therefore, unless explicitly provided for by Congress within another statute granting courts permission to reimburse witness fees beyond those amounts listed in Section 1821(b), only these limited amounts can be taxed as part of litigation costs.

In the dissenting opinion for Crawford Fitting Co. et al. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's decision to limit taxable costs under 28 U.S.C §1920 was a misinterpretation of Congress' intent and an unnecessary restriction on federal courts' discretion in awarding costs to prevailing parties in litigation cases. He contended that there were no explicit statutory limitations on what could be taxed as costs by a court clerk or judge, and thus expert witness fees should not be excluded from potential reimbursement if deemed appropriate by the court. Furthermore, he believed this ruling would disproportionately affect plaintiffs with legitimate claims but limited resources who might now hesitate before pursuing justice due to fear of high expert witness fees they couldn't recover even if victorious.