In Crawford v. Heysinger, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to compel a county auditor to issue a tax deed. The case arose when the plaintiff, Crawford, purchased a tract of land from Heysinger, who had obtained a tax deed from the county auditor. The deed was later challenged by a third party, and the county auditor refused to issue a new deed. The state court then issued a writ of mandamus to compel the county auditor to issue a new deed. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of mandamus. The Court reasoned that the county auditor was an officer of the state, and the state court did not have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus to compel a state officer to perform a duty. The Court further held that the state court could not issue a writ of mandamus to compel the county auditor to issue a tax deed, as the auditor was not required to issue a deed in the first place. The Court concluded that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of mandamus, and the county auditor was not required to issue a tax deed. The decision of the state court was reversed.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Crawford v. Heysinger, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both precedent and reason. The case concerned a dispute over title to land in California between two parties who had each acquired their respective interests from different branches of a single family. Justice Field argued that under California law, when multiple persons have an interest in property and one party conveys his or her interest without specifying which portion is being conveyed, then all of the interests are considered as having been transferred together unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise. In this case, he noted that no such evidence existed; therefore, it should be assumed that both parties' interests were conveyed together by virtue of their common ancestor's deed. As such, Justice Field concluded that neither party could claim exclusive ownership rights over any particular part of the land at issue since they had jointly inherited it from their ancestor with undivided interests intact.