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In the 1906 case of Cruit v. Owen, the U.S Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over land ownership in Oklahoma. The plaintiff, Cruit, claimed that he had purchased a piece of property from an individual who had received it as part of an allotment under federal law which provided lands to Native Americans. However, this law also prohibited the sale or transfer of these lands for a certain period without approval from the President. The defendant, Owen, argued that since there was no presidential approval for this transaction and because he subsequently acquired title to this land through another route (a tax deed), he should be recognized as its rightful owner. The court ruled in favor of Owen on two grounds: First, they found that even if Cruit's claim were valid - which they did not concede - his failure to take possession meant that his rights could be superseded by someone else who did so; Second and more importantly though was their finding regarding legality – namely that any purported sale or transfer made contrary to statutory restrictions is void ab initio (from inception) meaning it has no legal effect whatsoever thus rendering moot any subsequent claims based upon such transactions.
In the dissenting opinion for Cruit v. Owen, the justice disagreed with the majority's interpretation of property rights and inheritance law. The dissent argued that a person should have full control over their property after death, including determining who inherits it. They believed that this right was fundamental and protected by constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection under the law. Furthermore, they contended that denying someone this right based on their marital status or whether they had children was discriminatory and unjustified interference in personal affairs by state authorities. Therefore, according to them, laws restricting testamentary freedom were unconstitutional unless there was compelling evidence showing such restrictions served a legitimate public interest.