Term: 2013
Docket: 13-339
Cts Corp. v. Waldburger
- Pro
13-339 CTS CORPORATION V. WALDBURGER DECISION BELOW: 723 F.3d 434 CERT. GRANTED 1/10/2014 QUESTION PRESENTED: For certain state-law tort actions involving environmental harms, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) preempts the state statute of limitations' commencement date and replaces it with a delayed commencement date provided by federal law. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 9658 provides that if "the applicable limitations period for such an action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute." Id. § 9658(a)(1). Section 9658, in turn, defines "applicable limitations period"-i.e., the state laws to which § 9658 applies-to "mean[] the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought." Id § 9658(b)(2). In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deepened a split in the state and federal appellate courts by interpreting § 9658 to preempt not just state statutes of limitations but also state statutes of repose. A statute of limitations extinguishes a claimant's right to pursue a cause of action after a certain period of time following accrual, whereas a statute of repose abolishes a cause of action as to a particular defendant after a period of time, regardless of whether the claim has accrued. The question presented is: Did the Fourth Circuit correctly interpret 42 U.S.C. § 9658 to apply to state statutes of repose in addition to state statutes of limitations? LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-1290
The U.S. Supreme Court case CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 2013 revolved around the interpretation of federal environmental law and its preemption of state laws regarding statute of limitations for filing lawsuits related to environmental contamination. The residents living near an electronics plant in Asheville, North Carolina owned by CTS Corporation filed a lawsuit claiming that they had been harmed by chemicals contaminating their well water from the plant's operations decades earlier. However, CTS argued that under North Carolina's "statute of repose," which sets a hard deadline on when such claims can be made regardless of when harm is discovered, the suit was time-barred as it was filed more than ten years after their last act at this site. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of CTS Corp., stating that while Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) does preempt state statutes limiting the time within which lawsuits may be brought once damage is discovered (statutes of limitation), it does not preempt statutes barring suits after a specified period since defendant’s last culpable act or omission (statutes of repose). Therefore, North Carolina’s statute could bar plaintiffs’ claims.
In the dissenting opinion for CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority's interpretation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) was incorrect. She believed that Congress intended to pre-empt state statutes of limitations in toxic tort cases when it enacted CERCLA, not just federal ones as held by the majority. According to her view, this would allow victims more time to discover harm caused by environmental pollution and seek redress accordingly. She also pointed out that many states have discovery rules similar to North Carolina’s statute repose which could potentially bar claims before they are even discovered if interpreted like the majority did in this case.
