In Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., the U.S Supreme Court held that a medical malpractice claim brought by an individual against a professional limited liability company (PLLC) was not barred by Virginia’s statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims because the PLLC did not qualify as “a health care provider” under state law and thus could not take advantage of the extended time period provided to such providers in which to bring suit against them for negligence or other wrongful acts related to their practice of medicine or healthcare services they provide. The court reasoned that since Virginia's definition of "health care provider" only included natural persons, partnerships, corporations and associations, but excluded any type of business entity like a PLLC from its scope; therefore it would be inappropriate to extend the protections afforded by this statute beyond those entities specifically enumerated in it and allow them to benefit from its provisions when they are otherwise ineligible due solely to their form as legal entities rather than individuals or organizations providing healthcare services directly themselves .

In the case of Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., the Supreme Court of Virginia issued a dissenting opinion. The majority opinion held that the plaintiff, Cummings, had failed to state a claim for relief under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA). The dissenting opinion, however, argued that Cummings had sufficiently alleged a claim under the VCPA. The dissenting opinion argued that Cummings had sufficiently alleged a claim under the VCPA because he had alleged that Premier Rehab Keller had engaged in deceptive acts or practices in the course of trade or commerce. Specifically, Cummings had alleged that Premier Rehab Keller had misrepresented the amount of money he would receive from his insurance company for his medical services. The dissenting opinion argued that this was sufficient to state a claim under the VCPA. The dissenting opinion also argued that Cummings had sufficiently alleged a claim under the VCPA because he had alleged that Premier Rehab Keller had engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the course of trade or commerce. Specifically, Cummings had alleged that Premier Rehab Keller had failed to disclose the amount of money he would receive from his insurance company for his medical services. The dissenting opinion argued that this was sufficient to state a claim under the VCPA. The dissenting opinion concluded by arguing that Cummings had sufficiently alleged a claim under the VCPA and that the majority opinion was incorrect in holding that he had failed to state a claim for relief. The dissenting opinion argued that Cummings should be allowed to proceed with his claim and that the majority opinion should be reversed.