Cushing v. Laird was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a federal court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a military officer. The case arose when a former Union Army officer, William Cushing, sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia. Cushing had been dismissed from the Army for alleged misconduct and he sought to challenge the legality of his dismissal. The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a judicial remedy that could only be issued by a court with jurisdiction over the person or property in question. Since the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction over the military officer, it could not issue the writ. The Court further held that the writ of habeas corpus was not available to challenge the legality of a military officer's dismissal. The Court's decision in Cushing v. Laird established that federal courts do not have the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of a military officer's dismissal. The decision also established that the writ of habeas corpus is not available to challenge the legality of a military officer's dismissal.

In Cushing v. Laird, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a writ of habeas corpus should be issued for an individual who had been arrested and detained by military officers without any charges being brought against him. The majority opinion held that the writ could not be issued because it would interfere with the power of Congress to regulate the army and navy. Justice Field dissented from this decision, arguing that while Congress has authority over matters related to national defense, they do not have absolute control over all aspects of life in America; rather, certain fundamental rights are protected under both state and federal law which cannot be infringed upon even when there is a need for national security measures. He argued that individuals must still have access to due process protections such as habeas corpus proceedings if their liberty is taken away without cause or justification.