In the case of D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin (1931), the U.S Supreme Court dealt with a dispute over a contract for the sale of goods between two parties - D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc., and Popkin. The main issue was whether or not an oral agreement to extend credit beyond what was initially agreed upon in writing could be enforced under New York's statute of frauds law which requires certain contracts to be in writing to be enforceable. The court ruled that while generally an oral modification extending credit would fall within the statute of frauds and thus need to be in writing, there were exceptions where such modifications could still bind both parties if they acted on them as though they were binding agreements. In this particular case, it found that since both parties had conducted business based on their oral agreement for extended credit terms without any objections from either side until after disputes arose later on other matters unrelated to those terms; it constituted sufficient evidence showing mutual assent by conduct thereby making it legally binding despite being orally made.

The dissenting opinion in the case of D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin argued that the majority's decision to uphold a lower court ruling against D. Ginsberg & Sons was incorrect and failed to properly interpret New York state law regarding contract obligations and liabilities for damages incurred during business transactions between merchants or traders. The dissenting justices believed that under applicable laws, Popkin should have been held responsible for any losses resulting from his failure to deliver goods as per their agreement with D.Ginsberg & Sons, Inc., rather than placing all liability on the latter party simply because they were unable to provide adequate proof of damage at trial due to circumstances beyond their control.