The Supreme Court case Daily Income Fund, Inc. et al. v. Fox in 1983 revolved around the interpretation of Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 which imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers with respect to compensation for services and provides shareholders with a private right of action for breach thereof. The plaintiffs, shareholders in Daily Income Fund (DIF), alleged that DIF's adviser had breached this duty by charging excessive fees but failed to demonstrate any actual damages resulting from these charges. The key issue was whether proof of actual damages is necessary under Section 36(b). The court held that it is not required; instead, the plaintiff must only show that the fee structure could not have been negotiated at arm’s length as would be expected in an ordinary competitive market situation. This decision clarified how courts should interpret and apply Section 36(b), emphasizing its purpose to prevent abusive practices rather than compensate investors for losses suffered due to such abuses.

In the dissenting opinion for Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox (1983), Justice White argued that the majority's interpretation of Section 16(b) of the Investment Company Act was too narrow and failed to consider Congress' intent when drafting this legislation. He believed that Congress intended to prevent all forms of short-swing trading by insiders, not just those involving equity securities as defined by Section 3(a)(11). Therefore, he disagreed with the majority's decision to exclude repurchase agreements from being considered equity securities under this section. Furthermore, Justice White criticized the majority for relying on a technical reading of statutory language rather than considering broader policy implications and legislative history in their interpretation. He also expressed concern about potential loopholes created by such a narrow definition which could allow insiders to profit unfairly at shareholders' expense.