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16-961 DALMAZZI V. UNITED STATES DECISION BELOW: 76 M.J. 1 CONSOLIDATED WITH 16-1017 AND 16-1423 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. IN ADDITION TO THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONS, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE CASES IN NOS. 16- 961 AND 16-1017 UNDER 28 U. S. C. § 1259(3). DALMAZZI v. UNITED STATES, 16-961 AND COX v. UNITED STATES, 16-1017 DISMISSED AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. CERT. GRANTED 9/28/2017 QUESTION PRESENTED: Since shortly after the Civil War, federal law has required express authorization from Congress before active-duty military officers may hold a "civil office,” including positions that require "an appointment by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). After President Obama nominated and the Senate confirmed Colonel Martin T. Mitchell as a judge of the Article I U.S. Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), Judge Mitchell continued to serve on the U.S. Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) rejected as moot Petitioner's challenge to Judge Mitchell's continued service on the AFCCA, because his CMCR commission had not been signed until after the AFCCA decided her case on the merits-even though she moved for reconsideration after the commission was signed. The Questions Presented are: 1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Petitioner's claims were moot. 2. Whether Judge Mitchell's service on the CMCR disqualified him from continuing to serve on the AFCCA under 10 U.S.C. § 973(b)(2)(A)(ii). 3. Whether Judge Mitchell's simultaneous service on both the CMCR and the AFCCA violated the Appointments Clause. LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 16-0651
The case of Dalmazzi v. United States in 2017 revolved around the issue of whether military officers could serve on both a military court and a civilian court simultaneously, which was challenged by Nicole A. Dalmazzi, an Air Force captain who had been convicted in a Court-Martial Appeal (CMA). The judges presiding over her appeal were also appointed to the U.S Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR), violating the dual-officeholding ban under Article II Section 2 Clause 2 of the Constitution according to Dalmazzi's argument. However, she did not raise this objection during her CMA proceedings but only after they concluded when petitioning for review at Supreme Court level. The Supreme Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over such cases as per section 973(b)(2)(A) exception allowing certain types of dual office holding within national defense framework and found no error affecting substantial rights even if there was any violation.
In the dissenting opinion for Dalmazzi v. United States, Justice Alito argued that there was no violation of the Appointments Clause or any statute in allowing military officers to serve on both a Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) and an Air Force Court. He contended that Congress had clearly authorized dual service through legislation and that this did not infringe upon the President's appointment powers as outlined in the Constitution. Furthermore, he disagreed with his colleagues' interpretation of 10 U.S.C §973(b)(2)(A), arguing it does not bar military officers from holding a second office within the government if they are detailed to it rather than appointed. Therefore, he believed Ms. Dalmazzi’s conviction should have been upheld by CMCR judges who also served on an Air Force court.