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Dandelet v. Smith was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the issue of whether a state court had the authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus to a prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The case arose when a prisoner, Dandelet, was convicted in a federal court and sentenced to imprisonment. He then sought a writ of habeas corpus from a state court, claiming that his conviction was unconstitutional. The state court granted the writ and ordered the prisoner released. The Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's judgment. The Court also noted that the writ of habeas corpus was a remedy of last resort and that the prisoner should have exhausted all other remedies before seeking the writ. In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the state court did not have the authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus to the prisoner who had been convicted in a federal court. The Court reasoned that the writ of habeas corpus was a federal remedy and that the state court did not have the power to interfere with the federal court's judgment.
Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Dandelett v. Smith, arguing that the majority had erred by failing to consider a prior decision of the Supreme Court of California which held that an action for damages could be maintained against a railroad company for injuries sustained as a result of its negligence. He argued that this precedent should have been followed and applied to this case, rather than relying on general principles established in other cases from different jurisdictions. Justice Field further noted that while it was true there were some differences between the facts presented in those cases and those before them, they did not rise to such an extent as would justify disregarding or overruling what he considered binding authority on point. As such, he concluded his dissent by expressing regret at being unable to concur with his colleagues’ judgment and urging them instead to follow existing law set forth by their sister court's ruling.