Davenport v. County of Dodge was a United States Supreme Court case that addressed the issue of whether a county could be held liable for damages caused by a defective bridge. The plaintiff, Davenport, was injured when his wagon fell through a bridge that had been built by the county. The county argued that it was not liable for the damages because it had not been negligent in constructing the bridge. The Supreme Court held that the county was liable for the damages caused by the defective bridge. The Court reasoned that the county had a duty to maintain the bridge in a safe condition and that it had breached this duty by failing to inspect the bridge and repair any defects. The Court also noted that the county had received notice of the defect prior to the accident and had failed to take any action to remedy the situation. The Court concluded that the county was liable for the damages caused by the defective bridge and ordered it to pay the plaintiff for his injuries. This case established the principle that a county can be held liable for damages caused by a defective bridge if it has failed to inspect and repair the bridge in a timely manner.

Justice Field delivered the dissenting opinion in Davenport v. County of Dodge, arguing that the majority's decision was contrary to both precedent and sound legal reasoning. He argued that a county is not liable for damages resulting from its failure to perform duties imposed by statute unless it has received consideration or compensation for such performance. In this case, he noted, there had been no consideration given nor any promise made by the county in exchange for performing its statutory duty; thus, it could not be held liable under existing law. Furthermore, Justice Field argued that even if there had been some form of consideration provided to induce performance of said duty - which he found unlikely - then such an agreement would have constituted a contract between the parties and should have been enforced as such rather than allowing recovery on tort principles alone. Finally, Justice Field concluded his dissent with an assertion that public policy considerations weighed heavily against imposing liability upon counties without their consent or knowledge when they fail to fulfill their statutory obligations due solely to negligence or oversight on their part.