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In Davis v. Georgia (1976), the United States Supreme Court overturned a death sentence due to potential bias in jury selection. The case involved William Henry Furman, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Georgia court. However, during his trial, prospective jurors were asked if they had any moral or religious objections to capital punishment; those who did were excluded from serving on the jury. This practice was challenged as it could lead to juries that are more likely than not to impose the death penalty - thus violating Furman's constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, including excessive fines or degrading treatment or punishment. The Supreme Court agreed with this argument and ruled that such exclusionary practices violated Furman's right to an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of U.S Constitution because it skewed juries towards favoring capital punishment over other penalties for serious crimes like murder. This decision set a precedent for future cases involving similar issues around juror selection in capital trials - leading courts across America reconsider their approach towards selecting jurors when dealing with cases where defendants face possible execution if found guilty.
In the dissenting opinion for Davis v. Georgia, Justice White disagreed with the majority's decision to overturn Davis' death sentence due to potential racial bias in jury selection. He argued that there was no clear evidence of systematic exclusion of black jurors or racially motivated discrimination in this particular case. Furthermore, he contended that even if such bias existed at a broader level within the justice system, it did not necessarily invalidate this specific verdict and sentence. The dissent also criticized the majority for overstepping its judicial authority by making assumptions about juror motivations without sufficient factual basis and intervening too heavily into state court proceedings.