The U.S. Supreme Court case Davis, Director General of Railroads v. Green in 1922 revolved around the issue of whether a state could exercise jurisdiction over a federal entity without its consent. The plaintiff, Mrs. Green, filed suit against Mr. Davis as the representative for railroads under federal control during World War I after her husband was killed while working on one such railroad in North Carolina due to alleged negligence by the company's employees. Davis argued that since he represented a federally-controlled entity and had not given his consent to be sued within North Carolina’s courts, they lacked jurisdiction over him according to principles of sovereign immunity (the legal doctrine that prevents governments from being sued without their permission). However, the court ruled against this argument stating that when Congress passed legislation allowing suits related to railway accidents it implicitly waived any claim of sovereign immunity. Therefore, even though Davis acted as an agent for a federal agency at time of accident - which would normally grant him protection from lawsuits under sovereign immunity - because Congress allowed these types of lawsuits through specific legislation he could still be held accountable within state courts.

In the dissenting opinion for Davis, Director General of Railroads v. Green, Justice Holmes argued that the case should be decided based on federal law rather than state law because it involved a federal entity - the Director General of Railroads. He contended that Congress had intended to create uniformity in railroad operations and liability when it nationalized railroads during World War I under the Federal Control Act. Therefore, he believed that applying different state laws would undermine this goal. Furthermore, he disagreed with majority's interpretation of Section 206 of Transportation Act which allowed lawsuits against "the agent designated by President". According to him, this provision was meant to allow suits against government officers who were acting as agents for federally controlled entities like railroads but not necessarily make them personally liable for damages caused by their actions or decisions made within scope of their duties.